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What We Do When We Do What We Do
and Why We Do It*
LEO KATZ**
The general purpose of my remarks is the same as my fellow-
speakers'-to explore what we do when we do what we do and why we
do it. But my specific aim is going to be different. My specific aim is to
make us self-conscious about an important aspect of legal scholarship
that we usually deal with by instinct or intuition rather than self-
consciously. Being self-conscious about what you do is a risky thing, to
be sure, as noted in a famous little verse, which goes like this:
The centipede was happy quite
Until a toad in fun
Said "Pray, which leg goes after which?"
That wrought its mind to such a pitch
It lay distracted in a ditch
Considering how to run.'
Indeed, a psychology book I recently read gives the following diabolical
piece of advice for unhinging your tennis opponent: compliment him on
his strongest stroke, and be very specific about what is so terrific about
this stroke. It will make him so self-conscious about it, he will flub it
the next few times for sure.
But there are some upsides to self-consciousness, too. Knowing the
rules of grammar or the meter of blank verse is not pointless, even if you
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1. The origin of this verse is unknown.
rarely consult them when you speak, write, or versify. The chief benefit
to being self-conscious about what you do as a legal scholar is that you
might be able to extend a trick that you use instinctively in one domain
of your scholarship into a domain where it would work equally well if
only you would think to try it there. The particular aspect of legal
scholarship I want to make you self-conscious about is one which
philosophers of science have started to pay considerable attention to in
recent years: first, when they tried to explain what it is that
mathematicians do when they do what they do, later to explain what
natural scientists do when they do what they do, later yet, to explain
what social scientists do when they do what they do. It stands to reason
that it can also explain what we legal scholars do when we do what we
do. What philosophers of science have claimed about mathematics, and
later about the sciences more generally, is that what it really comes
down to, or what a good part of it comes down to anyway, is the search
for symmetry and for asymmetry. The Princeton mathematician
Hermann Weyl, in a famous set of lectures simply titled Symmetry,2
advises all scholars, mathematicians especially but he exempts no one,
that the best way to explore any subject you are interested in (provided
you are dealing with what he calls a "structure-endowed entity'") is to
explore its symmetries and asymmetries. Most of what is important or
interesting about any subject, Weyl claims, you will uncover if you
simply look for those.
But what exactly am I talking about when I speak of symmetry and
asymmetry in law and ethics? It may be clear enough what those
notions mean in geometry, but how are they to be understood in law, or
for that matter in ethics, more generally? Let me start with symmetry-
its meaning and the benefits of exploring it. Rather than try to define the
term, however, I will offer what I think is a pretty self-explanatory
example of the phenomenon as it arises in law and ethics. It is an
example that has fascinated me for quite some time: the symmetry
between the principles by which we dispense praise and those by which
we dispense blame.
The principles by which we dole out blame are the familiar rules of
the criminal law. The interesting thing is that the principles by which
we give out praise are an exact mirror image of the rules of criminal law.
Just as we condemn someone more if he caused harm by an act rather
than an omission, we praise someone more if he caused a good
consequence by an act rather than an omission. And just as we condemn
someone more if he intentionally caused harm rather than inadvertently,
2. HERmANNWEYL, SYMMETRY (1952).
3. Id. at 144.
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we praise him more if he caused a good consequence intentionally rather
than inadvertently. And just as we condemn someone more if he caused
harm as a principal rather than as an accomplice, we praise someone
more if he caused a good consequence as a principal rather than as an
accomplice. And just as we condemn someone more if he tried and
succeeded in causing some harm than if he merely unsuccessfully
attempted it, we praise someone more if he tried and succeeded in
causing some good consequence rather than merely unsuccessfully
attempted to bring it about. This should give you a pretty good idea of
what the idea of symmetry comes to in the legal or the ethical context.
Now what is the benefit in focusing on such symmetries? Simply put,
the search for symmetry serves to reveal larger patterns in the law and
these larger patterns allow us to understand all sorts of matters that
previously seemed puzzling. If one is puzzled, for instance, as to why
the law attaches such significance to the difference between causing a
harm by an omission and causing it by an act, one is likely to feel less
puzzled once one sees the distinction as part and parcel of a larger
principle of responsibility that holds for the dispensation both of blame
and of praise, and once one sees how intuitively compelling the principle
becomes when applied to praise. If we did not draw the act or omission
distinction when it comes to praise, we would have to praise equally
lavishly the person who brought about some particularly praiseworthy
result and the person who simply failed to prevent it by not standing in
the way of its attainment.
Let me illustrate the benefits of this search for symmetry further by
pointing to a number of famous insights in law and ethics which
basically come down to the uncovering of a hitherto overlooked
symmetry. Start with the Coase theorem. The key insight that makes
the Coase theorem take off is a simple symmetry argument. When I play
my music so loud as to be a nuisance to my neighbor, then it may be
tempting to think of me as the cause of the problem. But, as Coase
points out, that is much too quick; for there to be a nuisance requires not
just a perpetrator but a victim. Indeed, on closer inspection, perpetrator
and victim play such symmetrical roles in the creation of the nuisance
that one cannot really persist in calling the music player the perpetrator
and the music listener the victim, or in doing what at first glance seems
like the legally, ethically, and economically sensible thing, namely
4. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
making the music player pay for the discomfort he inflicts on the
listener. It is the symmetry of perpetrator and victim that lies at the heart
of the Coase theorem.
Consider next Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument in favor of the
permissibility of abortion What exactly is the point of the hypothetical
about someone who wakes up in a hospital hooked up to a world-famous
violinist? Thomson wants to argue that a mother has no duty to carry
her fetus to term because the person who finds himself hooked up to that
violinist has no duty to remain hooked up to him. And the reason he
does not have such duty is that we generally do not impose a duty on
citizens to be good samaritans. What had not been perceived before
Thomson came up with her example is the symmetry between the good
samaritan case, in which we think aid would be nice but not mandatory,
and the abortion case.
Take Hohfeld's great analysis of rights.6 What it amounts to at bottom
is the discovery of a series of overlooked symmetry relationships
between various kinds of rights. What he uncovered was the multiple
symmetries between our multiple rights-related concepts-that of a duty,
a claim, a privilege, a license, a power, an immunity. Hohfeld
discovered that you can neatly characterize a claim as being nothing
more than the presence of a duty, a privilege as the absence of a duty, a
power as the ability to alter duties, and so on. It was a pattern no one
had clearly discerned before. But to say it is a pattern leaves the matter
unnecessarily imprecise. It was a series of symmetries he unearthed-
that is much of the source of his appeal.
Then there is Calabresi and Melamed's great paper on property rules,
liability rules, and inalienability rules-their view of the cathedral. At
the heart of their paper is a set of symmetries characterizing the way all
entitlements across the legal landscape are protected. They all come
down to being bundles of three very simple kinds of protections-
property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules. What Calabresi
and Melamed uncovered was both a symmetry across all manner of legal
contexts and a set of symmetries as between different kinds of remedies.
Obvious though their insight seems in retrospect, no one had properly
noticed before that we are dealing with three ways of protecting
entitlements differing in the narrow way that liability rules, property
rules, and inalienability rules do.
5. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHL. PUB. AFF. 47
(1971).
6. See WESLEY NEVCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-64
(1923).
7. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamned, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
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Perhaps none of these examples strike you as sufficiently legal to
make the case that symmetry is at the heart of legal scholarship. Coase
and Calabresi and Melamed you may tend to allocate to economics,
Hohfeld and Thomson to philosophy. So take something as
quintessentially legal as the General Part of the Criminal Law-the
systematic presentation of our rules of criminal responsibility.
What makes the General Part so general is that it lays bare the key
symmetries running through all of our criminal offenses-the act-
omission distinction, the voluntary act requirement, causation,
complicity, attempt, the basic forms of mens rea, and the classic
defenses. But it goes further than that. The General Part reveals
symmetries between these different elements; symmetries between
different forms of mens rea (intention, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence); symmetries between the principles of attempt and the
principles of complicity; symmetries between the different prongs of the
act requirement; symmetries between necessity and duress and self-
defense and defense of others. Relationships that had previously been
only dimly sensed are laid out in the General Part with stunning, if not
exhaustive, completeness.
Well, the search for symmetries is only one half of the agenda that I
said legal theory typically pursues. The other half is the search for
asymmetry. Let me begin by explaining more fully what I have in mind
by asymmetry in the legal and ethical context and then go on to show the
benefit for searching them out.
For a striking instance of asymmetry, let us revisit the rules by which
we dispense praise and blame. Given what I said earlier, we would in
general expect the rules to be mirror images of each other. The
astonishing thing is that there are many situations in which the rules fail
to mirror each other, even though we would expect them to. For
example, if someone commits a crime while insane, we do not blame
him. But, interestingly, if someone does something quite praiseworthy
while insane, that generally does not stop us from praising him. Van
Gogh painted several paintings in a state of mind which, if he had
committed a crime while in that state of mind, he could not be held
responsible for. Yet, we continue to praise his artistic achievement. Or
think of someone who takes a great risk in order to bring about some
praiseworthy consequence. We think his taking that risk makes him all
the more praiseworthy. But compare him to someone who takes a great
risk in order to commit some terrible crime. We do not think him extra-
blameworthy because he took that risk. Those are tantalizing instances
of asymmetry-the role of insanity when it comes to praise versus when
it comes to blame, the role of risk-taking when it comes to praise versus
when it comes to blame. Once one has noticed such asymmetries, of
course, one has to try to explain them. But first one has to notice them.
And that is just what the search for asymmetries does for us: it generates
intriguing research questions it would not otherwise have occurred to us
to ask.
Let me add a few more examples to illustrate the fruitfulness of
looking for such asymmetries. Consider, for example, an article by
Larry Alexander on the subject of precedent.8 The ostensible purpose of
the article is to inquire why we find precedent ethically binding. But, at
the heart of the article is Larry's puzzlement at finding an asymmetry
where one would expect to find symmetry. When a doctor has treated a
patient in a certain kind of way for a certain disease, and the doctor then
encounters another patient with the identical disease, but he has since
changed his mind about what the best treatment would be, what should
the doctor do? Why, treat the patient in accordance with his latest best
judgment, of course-it would be malpractice to do anything else. But
what do we expect of a judge who has disposed of a certain case in one
way and then encounters another case that is on all fours with the prior
one-but the judge has changed his mind as to what the best way to
dispose of such a case would be? We think he should attach a lot of
weight to the way he decided the prior case. But that makes for a
strange asymmetry between medical and judicial decision makers. The
doctor is supposed to do the best he can given everything he knows at
the time, and the judge is not. What could account for this asymmetry?
Larry concludes that nothing can. Whether you agree with him is beside
the point; the thing to note is the potent role that the discovery of an
asymmetry plays in suggesting an immensely fruitful question.
Here is yet a further example of the discovery of an asymmetry being
used to generate an immensely fruitful line of questions: the tax
expenditure debate. Granting someone a deduction and granting him a
subsidy are very symmetrical things. Both involve the government
putting some money into a taxpayer's pocket. That would lead one to
expect deductions and subsidies to be governed by fairly symmetrical
tax principles. What tax scholars noted is that this expectation of
symmetry, strangely enough, is in fact not fulfilled. Deductions and
subsidies are treated remarkably asymmetrically. We grant people
deductions for business expenses, charitable donations, medical
expenditures, all of which seems eminently reasonable, but suppose we
8. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 1 (1989).
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think of these deductions as subsidies. Suddenly they start to look
mighty strange. Deductions for business expenses and charitable
donations are typically claimed by wealthy people, but why are we
giving subsidies to the wealthy? Deductions for medical expenditures
put more money into the pockets of someone in a high tax bracket than
someone in a low tax bracket. But why are we giving more medical
assistance to the wealthy than the poor? It is a very neat puzzle that has
generated an illustrious line of articles. I have no idea what the answer
is, and I do not need to. All I mean to alert you to is the powerful role
that the discovery of an asymmetry plays in generating a fascinating line
of research.
Interestingly, the answers to these kinds of questions-why there is a
particular kind of asymmetry in a particular area of law-turn out to be
remarkably uniform, more uniform than has hitherto been noticed. The
usual answer turns out to be that what looks as though it is a violation of
symmetry actually involves a deeper kind of symmetry, or at least a
different kind of symmetry. A simple example of this is a problem in
tax law, the so-called marriage penalty. At first glance it strikes us as a
puzzling and unjust violation of symmetry that a person should be taxed
differently depending on whether he is married or not. The problem is
that we also think that there should be perfect symmetry between all
families, regardless of whether it is the husband who earns most of the
money, the wife who earns most of the money, or whether each earns
half of the family's income. As it turns out, in a progressive income tax
system we have a choice to make-only one kind of symmetry is
feasible. Either we treat all families symmetrically, regardless of how
the family income is generated, or we treat single and married people
symmetrically. One kind of symmetry is incompatible with the other
kind of symmetry; it is just not possible to have both.
The situation is like one that confronted Ann Landers some years ago.
The annoyed parents of two adult children wrote to Ann Landers
complaining that, whereas their married daughter dutifully brought her
husband and family to spend Thanksgiving and Christmas with them,
their son chose to spend the holidays with his in-laws instead. Why
could not sons be as dutiful as daughters? What they were complaining
about was an asymmetry-an asymmetry between sons and daughters.
Ann Landers, of course, pointed out to them that they were asking for a
logical impossibility-it is not possible for every married son and every
married daughter to make their families spend their holidays with their
parents rather than their in-laws, unless, of course, you treated some
parents differently from other parents. But that would just buy you one
kind of symmetry at the price of another.
So that is what I think legal scholarship is about. That is what I think
we do when we do what we do. We emulate Ann Landers, and Coase,
and Calabresi and Melamed, and Hohfeld, and Alexander: we look for
symmetries and asymmetries that the rest of the world has missed.
